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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Social, or „generalized‟, trust refers to beliefs that people hold about how other people in
society will in general act towards them. Can people in general be trusted? Or must one be
careful in dealing with people? This type of „thin‟, or „horizontal‟ trust is different from the
kind that people invest in family, friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and institutions that are
known to them. Social trust is more like a core value or belief; an abstract evaluation of the
moral standards of the society in which we live. This kind of trust is usually regarded as a
good thing, because it makes it easier for people to co-operate without the need for strict
contracts, regulation and enforcement. As Stolle puts it, trust is “a key social resource that
seems to oil the wheels of the market economy and democratic politics” (Stolle 2003 p19).

Because trust is so often seen as a good thing, it is important to understand why some people
trust more than others and therefore understand how it might be possible to increase social
trust in the population. A great deal of research has been focussed on this topic but our
contention in this paper is that much of it is hampered by severe methodological limitations.
In particular, the predominant reliance on cross-sectional survey data means that we cannot
be sure that the things that appear to be related to trust are the real causes of differences in
trust between individuals. In this paper we try to overcome some of these limitations by using
longitudinal data that captures changes in people‟s levels of trust over time. We can then
examine how some of the putative causes of trust relate to these changes. In so doing, we can
rule out many of the potential confounding influences that have not been measured in
previous studies and thereby enable us to make a more robust evaluation of what might really
be important.

In particular, we assess the influence of a particularly prominent mooted cause of trust: the
degree to which individuals are socially integrated via formal membership of civic
organisations and voluntary groups but also through informal social networks that exist
between friends and neighbours. We do this by fitting a range of statistical models to repeated
measures data from the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for
the widely held view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of either
a formal or an informal nature.
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ABSTRACT
Social, or ‗generalized‘, trust refers to beliefs that people hold about how other
people in society will in general act towards them. Can people in general be trusted?
Or must one be careful in dealing with people? Research on the antecedents of social
trust has typically relied on cross-sectional regression estimators to evaluate putative
causes. Our contention is that much of this research over-estimates the importance of
many of these causes because of the failure to account for unmeasured confounding
influences. In this paper we use longitudinal data to assess the causal status of a
particularly prominent mooted cause of trust: the degree to which individuals are
socially integrated via formal membership of civic organisations and through
friendship networks. We fit a range of regression estimators to repeated measures data
from the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for the
widely held view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of
either a formal or an informal nature.

KEYWORDS: SOCIAL TRUST; PANEL DATA; FIXED EFFECTS; SOCIAL
CAPITAL.

INTRODUCTION
Social, or ‗generalized‘ trust relates to beliefs held by individuals in a given society
about the moral orientation and incentive structure of a diffuse, unknown ‗other‘
(Delhey and Newton 2005). This type of ‗thin‘, or ‗horizontal‘ trust must be
differentiated from the instrumental, ‗strategic‘ trust we invest in family, friends,
colleagues, acquaintances, and institutions that are known to us (Hardin 1999; Putnam
2000; Uslaner 2002). While strategic trust is developed over time through direct
personal experience, social trust is more akin to a core value or belief; an abstract
evaluation of the moral standards of the society in which we live (Delhey and Newton
2003). To the extent that individuals within a society are inclined to make positive
evaluations of the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens, various normatively benign
consequences may be expected to follow at both the individual and societal levels.
This is because social trust is postulated to facilitate co-operative behaviour in the
absence of information about the trustworthiness of the ‗other‘. This type of diffuse
trust, it is argued, reduces social and economic transaction costs by lowering the need
for contracts, legal and regulatory frameworks, and other forms of coercive authority
(Hardin 1999; Luhmann 1979)1. It has been posited as the key mechanism through
which dis-connected individuals with divergent preferences can overcome collective
action problems (Arrow 1974; Fukayama 1995; Parsons). As Stolle puts it, trust is ―a
key social resource that seems to oil the wheels of the market economy and
democratic politics‖ (Stolle 2003 p19).
If trust is key to the attainment of social and economic prosperity, it goes
without saying that we should devote serious attention to understanding how it might
be nurtured, developed, and maintained. The case for deepening our understanding of
the origins of trust is all the more compelling in the context of its apparent precipitate
decline in advanced western democracies during the latter part of the twentieth
century (Hall 1999; Putnam 2000; Robinson and Jackson 2001). Our contention in
this paper is that much of the existing body of research into the causes of social trust
is hampered by limitations of methodology and data. In particular, the predominant
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the absence of trust.
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reliance on cross-sectional regression estimators is likely to result in substantial overestimation of the true effect of putative causes.
Our contribution is both methodological and substantive. Methodologically,
we show that conclusions based on cross-sectional regression can be fundamentally
altered once appropriate defence against unobserved confounding variables is
introduced. Substantively, we assess the causal status of a particularly prominent
mooted cause of trust in the theoretical literature – the degree to which individuals are
socially integrated via formal membership of civic organisations and voluntary groups
but also through informal social networks that exist between friends and neighbours.
We do this by fitting a range of regression estimators to repeated measures data from
the UK for the period 1998 to 2008. Our results show little support for the widely held
view that social trust results from integration within social networks, of either a
formal or an informal nature. We begin with a review of the relevant literature, before
describing our data, key measures and analytical strategy. We then present our results
and conclude with a discussion of their implications for our understanding of the
relationship between both formal and informal social connections and generalised
trust.

SOCIAL CONNECTIONS AND TRUST
Discussions about interpersonal trust and its correlates very often take place in the
context of the wider notion of social capital. An enormous quantity of theoretical and
empirical work on social capital has appeared in recent decades, and the concept has
found its way into the lexicons of government and policymakers, as well as of
sociologists, economists, political scientists and those working in other academic
disciplines. Although definitions of social capital are varied, the essential idea behind
the concept is that social networks are useful. For individuals, this means that social
investments have expected positive returns (Lin 2001). Although one can view the
accumulation of social capital as a rational goal (Coleman 1988a), it may be acquired
simply as a by-product of making affective ties with people in a non-instrumental
manner (Crow 2004). We can distinguish between two types of network that can yield
such returns: informal and formal. The former are identified in the literature as
predominantly friendship or extended familial networks (Granovetter 1973). The
latter are composed of participation in formally constituted civic organisations
2

(Putnam 2000). Membership of either type of network could be advantageous in a
host of different ways, for example enhanced job opportunities, greater resilience to
economic and social hardship, better mental health and wellbeing.
Where does trust enter into this conceptual network? The idea that generalised
trust emerges from the formal networks of civil society has a long and venerable
history (Almond and Verba 1963; de Tocqueville 1835; Mill 1937; Simmel 1903).
The essence of the idea is that those who join various types of civic association
gradually conform to in-group norms of co-operative behaviour, learning the benefits
of interpersonal reciprocity and trust via direct personal experience (Newton and
Norris 2000). However, it also seems obvious that some pre-existent degree of trust is
required before a citizen could reasonably join formally constituted civic organisation.
To take Putnam‘s example of American bowling leagues: one would be unlikely to
join without some expectation that other members will not cheat, steal the
membership fees and so on. It is a more open question as to how generalized trust
might relate to informal networks. The same positive reinforcement may occur
through repeated exposure. Or it may be that reliance on small friendship groups, for
instance in areas where there are few opportunities for formal participation in civil
society, may actually bolster distrust in generalized others, while raising the worth of
in-group co-operation. Even for formal civic organisations, the experience of
membership may not necessarily be positive, for instance local political organisations
may encourage cronyism that favours some members over others (Portes 1998).

It seems evident, then, that trusting and joining are likely to be related in some
way. However, the nature of the relationship - whether causal or not and under which
conditions it may exist - is less clear. Empirical research to date certainly provides
substantial evidence in favour of a relationship but it is generally weak on the
identification of a causal effect of social connections on the propensity to trust.
Numerous studies find membership of civic associations to be correlated with social
trust at the individual level (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Brehm and Rahn 1997;
Hooghe and Derks 1997; Soroka, Johnston and Banting 2005; Stolle and Rochon
1999), although others find no relationship at all, once appropriate controls are
introduced (Allum et al. 2010; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Delhey and Newton 2003;
Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Mayer 2003; Uslaner 2002; Whiteley 1999; Wollebaek
3

and Selle 2002). Part of the heterogeneity in the evidence on trusting and joining
might be due to the way that membership of formal networks has been
operationalized. Time spent engaged in these networks may be more important than
simply noting the number of different organisations of which citizens are members
(Andersen, Curtis and Grabb 2006; Stolle 1998). And some researchers distinguish
both between active and passive membership and between ‗isolated‘ and ‗connected‘
organisations, finding relationships between trusting and joining under particular
conditions (Mascherini, Vidoni and Manca 2010; Paxton 2007; Sonderkov 2010;
Stolle and Rochon 1998; Wollebaek and Selle 2002).
Informal social networks and day-to-day interaction with neighbours,
colleagues and acquaintances have also been examined in relation to trust, although
less often. (Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000). In a recent
paper, Li et al (2008) find some evidence for a correlation between informal
friendship network heterogeneity and social capital in the UK. In particular, they find
that upwardly socially mobile citizens who gain high status friends tend to be more
trusting.
Formal and informal social connections can interact, or assume different
relevance for different social groups or cultures. For example, Firdmuc and Gerxhani
(2005) show, using Eurobarometer survey data, that while women in some countries
are less likely to have formal associational ties, or networks that can provide a job,
they are more likely than men to have support networks that can help if they feel
depressed or if they need to borrow money. In a similar vein, Pichler and Wallace
(2007) show that the pattern of trusting and joining in Europe varies systematically
according to region. They find high levels of formal and informal social capital in
North-West Europe, high levels of informal social capital in Eastern Europe, and
neither kind in Southern Mediterranean Europe. Such evidence is indicative of the
empirical associations between trust and informal and formal social connectedness,
but casts little or no light on cause and effect, even though the implicit or explicit
presupposition of most studies is that interacting with others in either formal or
informal settings leads to greater levels of trust and, by implication, social capital
(Newton and Norris 2000).
However, as we have suggested at the outset of this paper, a fundamental
limitation of this and the other evidence marshalled in support of the effects of social
4

connections on interpersonal trust relates to the indeterminacy of the data and
statistical models generally employed. The vast majority of extant investigations rely
almost entirely on cross-sectional survey data. Because of the well-known inferential
limitations of this kind of static, observational data (Halaby 2003; Morgan and
Winship) we cannot be confident that the identified relationships, though robust, are
not spurious. This concern cannot be dismissed as the pedantry of ―the quibbling
econometrician‖ (Glaeser 2001), because any evidence suggesting that factors such as
social networks, income, and occupational status cause trust are undermined by the
very real possibility that some unmeasured characteristic is the true cause of the
observed associations. In short, the majority of the empirical evidence relating formal
and informal social connections to the generation of social trust suffers from
potentially severe endogeneity bias (Berry 1984; Hausman 1978).
We make no claim for originality in drawing attention to this problem. Indeed,
following an initial focus on understanding the ontological status of trust and mapping
its longitudinal and comparative trajectory in advanced democracies (Barber 1983;
Berg 1996; Coleman 1990; Coleman 1988b; Hall 1999; Paxton 1999; Putnam 2000;
Robinson and Jackson 2001; Whiteley 1999), more recent attention has focussed on
the question of how social trust is generated, or conversely, how it can be eroded over
time (Hooghe and Stolle 2003; Uslaner 2002). These are causal questions and it seems
clear that, if we are to develop satisfactory answers, we must move beyond crosssectional analysis, to incorporate research designs that provide greater leverage on the
crucial issue of causal identification.

A LONGITUDINAL PERSPECTIVE
A potentially fruitful strategy for improving understanding of the causes of social trust
is to make use of panel (or ‗repeated measures‘) data. The primary advantage of panel
data is that, under certain model specifications, it is possible to partial out all observed
and unobserved time-invariant characteristics of individual units (Allison 1994;
Halaby 2003; Halaby 2004; Wooldridge 2002). As Halaby puts it, ―the problem of
causal inference is fundamentally one of unobservables, and unobservables are at the
heart of the contribution of panel data to solving problems of causal inference‖ (2003,
p2). The incorporation of a longitudinal dimension yields crucial additional leverage
on questions of causal order, making it possible to model within-individual change as
5

a function of preceding ‗events‘ (Allison 1994). Because this approach is based on
the analysis of change in both dependent and independent variables within individuals
over time, the estimated model coefficients are purged of the effects of all fixed (or
‗time-invariant‘) respondent characteristics. Such fixed characteristics comprise both
the obvious, ‗usual suspects‘ such as gender, age cohort, and ethnicity, as well as less
easily measurable variables such as personality traits and pre-adult socialization
experiences.
A small number of studies in the existing literature have utilised repeated
measures data to examine the causes and consequences of trust (Claibourn and Martin
2000; Li, Pickles and Savage 2005; Stolle and Hooghe 2004a) The primary focus of
these studies has been on the relationship between, as Claibourn and Martin pithily
put it, ―trusting and joining‖, or the effect of the formal, generalised variant of trust
(social trust) on the similar variant of social connection (membership in voluntary
organisations). Using the Michigan Socialization Study (Jennings et al. 2004)
Claibourn and Martin find weak evidence of an effect of trust on later membership2
but no effect of membership on the subsequent propensity to trust. Using the same
data, Stolle and Hooghe (2004b) extend Claibourn and Martin‘s analysis to find that
parental trust and membership influence children‘s subsequent trust and membership,
net of children‘s own previous levels of trust and membership. Li et al (2005) find no
effect of membership on later trust, once previous levels of trust are controlled.
However, they do find significant direct effects of neighbourhood attachment and
social networks on subsequent levels of social trust. Although these investigations
make use of repeated measures of social trust, all three are limited to just two waves
of data and only Claibourn and Martin (2000) use measures of change on both sides of
the equation. This reduces their effectiveness in dealing with omitted variable bias,
relative to a specification which includes within-individual variance on both sides of
the regression equation (Allison 2005).

2

The evidence is indeed weak as is it is found only in the ‗parent‘ and not the ‗child‘ sample. Even the

parental effect is found only in the synchronous, not the lagged effects. The synchronous effects require
instrumental variables of unknown status for the purpose of identification.
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DATA AND MEASURES
Data for this analysis come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The
BHPS is a large-scale panel study covering a wide range of topics including
household composition, labour market experience, educational attainment, physical
and mental health, and social and political attitudes. At wave 1 of the survey, which
was conducted in 1991, interviews were completed with a total of approximately
5,500 households and 10,300 individuals. The BHPS has a stratified, multi-stage
random sample design, with interviews conducted annually via Computer Assisted
Personal Interview (CAPI) with all household members aged 16 and above (see Banks
et al (2005) for a detailed account of the BHPS sample design and data collection
methodology). Our analyses are based on the 10,264 Original Sample Members
(OSMs) who participated in the survey between 1991 and 2008. We exclude
temporary or booster sample members and, to retain sample size, allow participants to
drop in and out of waves. After taking into account that trust is not measured in every
wave (see below) in addition to missing values for membership questions, we are left
with approximately 40,000 observations derived from 8,883 individuals. For the fixed
effect models these numbers are reduced by approximately half due to individuals
maintaining a consistent trust response over the period of analysis.

Variables
Our dependent variable is the standard generalized trust question, which asks
respondents, ―In general, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you
can‘t be too careful these days‖. The question was administered in the 1998, 2000 and
2003, 2005, 2007 and 2008 waves of the survey. Respondents selecting the ‗most
people can be trusted‘ option are coded 1, those selecting ‗you can‘t be too careful‘
are coded 0. Respondents who spontaneously reported ‗it depends‘ (2% over all
waves) are also coded 0, although dropping these cases from the analysis makes no
material difference to the results we present here. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics
for the trust variable for the period covered by the analysis (1998-2008). Two things
are evident. First, although trust is generally considered to be highly stable at the
population level over time (Uslaner 2002), the proportion of trusters here exhibits
quite substantial variation from year to year, ranging from a high of 44% in 2003 to a
low of 33% in 2008. This pattern suggests that generalised trust is quite sensitive to
7

macro-level shocks in the external environment, although we have no leverage here
on identifying what these events might have been. Second, and related to the first,
there is a high level of instability in individual level reports of trust, with nearly half
of all sample members changing their trust response at least once over the period of
observation. Although a proportion of this individual level change can no doubt be
described as random measurement error, we can be confident that there is also a
substantial degree of real change in trust over time to be explained in our regressions.

Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Trust Measure 1998-2008

Year
Trust = No
%
Trust = Yes
%
Total
Change in trust t-1
%
Total
No. change 1998 - 2006
%

1998
4,659
60.96
2,984
39.04
7,643

2000
4,609
63.07
2,699
36.93
7,308

2003
3,745
55.61
2,989
44.39
6,734

2005
4,128
64.31
2,291
35.69
6,419

2007
3,666
59.90
2,454
40.10
6,120

2008
3,860
67.31
1,875
32.69
5,735

1,623
23.69
6,852

1,568
25.29
6,200

1,433
24.07
5,935

1,237
21.61
5,724

1,275
22.77
5,600
3,016
52.59

We use two measures of formal social connections. The first is a count of
associational memberships reported by the respondent. The BHPS contains questions
about membership of the following organisations and groups: political parties, trade
unions, environmental groups, parent associations, tenants/residents groups, religious
groups, voluntary service groups, community groups, social/working clubs, sports
clubs, and women‘s groups. Exploratory analysis of the first 10 items (excluding
women‘s groups because very few men report membership) resulted in a twodimensional factor solution, with membership of trade unions, sports groups and
social clubs loading on a separate factor. Paxton (2007) argues that membership of
these types of groups is indicative of what she terms ‗isolated‘ membership, to the
extent that they are weakly correlated with the probability of membership of other
groups. Paxton finds isolated membership to be unrelated to trust but connected
membership to be strongly related at both the individual and societal level. The
8

associational membership variable, therefore, excludes these three indicators from the
model, although the results remain essentially unchanged when all organisational
types are included. The second measure of formal social connections is a self-report
of frequency of attendance at religious services and meetings. Respondents were
offered the following response alternatives to denote frequency of attendance: Once a
week or more, Less often but at least once a month, Less often but at least once a year,
Never or practically, never, Only at weddings, funerals etc.
We also include two measures of informal social connections, both of which
measure the frequency of interpersonal contact, rather than the density of networks.
The first relates to contact with friends and relatives who are not resident with the
respondent: ‗How often do you meet friends or relatives who are not living with you?,
the second to frequency of talking to neighbours: ―How often do you talk to any of
your neighbours?‘ Both questions are answered on a 5 point scale, with the following
response options: On most days, once or twice a week, once or twice a month, less
often than once a month, never. For the meeting with friends and relatives question,
only 24 respondents in the analysis sample used the ‗never‘ category, so this was
combined with ‗less than one month‘. Models are estimated with and without the
following vector of covariates: gender, current financial situation, health status over
last 12mths, number of children in household, marital status, years of schooling,
degree status, unemployment status, income quintiles, age and social class

ANALYSIS
To assess the relationship between formal and informal of social connections and trust
we estimate panel data regressions, with trust predicted by each of the social
connection indicators and individual level covariates. The model has the following
general form:

 P
log it
 1  Pit


   t  xit 1  z i  i


(2)

where Pit is trust measured for individual i at time point t,  t is a time-specific
intercept and xit 1 is a vector of time-varying independent variables lagged by one
9

year. z i is a vector of time-invariant covariates,  i represents the effect of all timeinvariant unmeasured characteristics of sample members, and  and  are regression
coefficients to be estimated for, respectively, the time-varying and the time-invariant
covariate vectors. A parsimonious way of estimating the model in equation (2) is to
treat the person specific intercept,  i , as a normally distributed random variable with
mean zero and variance,

, the so-called ‗random effects‘ model (Skrondal and

Rabe-Hesketh 2004).
A key assumption of the random effects model is that there is zero correlation
between  i and the covariate vectors, E(  |x) =E(  | z )= 0. In substantive terms,
this restriction implies that there is zero correlation between the observed covariates
and all stable but unobserved influences on trust over the time period. An alternative
model specification treats  i , not as a random variable, but as a fixed constant for
each individual and, thereby, requires no assumptions about the correlation between
observed and unobserved causes of the outcome. This is the ‗fixed effects‘ estimator
which, though inefficient relative to the random effects model, provides consistent
estimates of  , even when there is a non-zero correlation between the intercept and
the independent variables in the model (Allison 2005). The key advantage of the fixed
effects estimator, then, is that it yields coefficient estimates that are purged of the
effects of all potential time-invariant confounders, both observed and unobserved. It is
for this reason that, when the principle threat to valid causal inference relates to
omitted variable bias, the fixed effects model is to be preferred (Halaby 2004).
Because our dependent variable here is binary, we use the conditional logit
estimator3 implemented in Stata 10 (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). To test
whether the random or the fixed effects estimates should be preferred we use the
Hausman test for omitted variable bias (Hausman 1978). Significant values of the
Hausman test indicate that the unit heterogeneity in the random effects model (  i )
has a non-zero correlation with the observed covariates (xit and z i ) and that the

3

Conditional logistic regression is necessary due to the incidental parameters problem which arises in

the case of repeated binary outcomes (see Chamberlain 1980).
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parameter estimates for the random effects model are biased by the un-modeled
influence of omitted variables (Halaby 2004).

RESULTS
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates and associated standard errors for the six
models, adjusted for the clustered sample design. Models 1 and 4 are equivalent to a
standard cross-sectional logit model, with and without controls, respectively. (The
controls we employ are: gender, current financial situation, health status over last
12mths, number of children in household, marital status, years of schooling, degree
status, unemployment status, income quintiles, age and social class.) The purpose of

Table 2

Pooled, Random and Fixed Effect Regression Estimates (logits)
No controls
Pooled
RE
(1)
(2)

Formal connections
Memberships
Religious Attendance
(ref=once a week or more)
at least once a month
at least once a year
Never
only at weddings, funerals
etc
Informal Connections
Talking to neighbours
(ref=Most days)
Once or twice a week
One or twice a month
Less than once a month
Never

FE
(3)

With Controls
Pooled
RE
FE
(4)
(5)
(6)

0.407*** 0.357*** 0.022 0.257*** 0.232*** 0.016
(0.023) (0.030) (0.036) (0.023) (0.030) (0.036)
.
.
.
.
.
.
-0.043 -0.226* -0.128 -0.114 -0.212* -0.125
(0.073) (0.102) (0.124) (0.075) (0.101) (0.124)
0.093
-0.184* -0.035 0.016
-0.133 -0.035
(0.065) (0.093) (0.124) (0.066) (0.091) (0.124)
-0.188** -0.467*** -0.087 -0.150* -0.335*** -0.086
(0.062) (0.092) (0.128) (0.064) (0.091) (0.128)
-0.192** -0.467*** -0.114 -0.182** -0.350*** -0.119
(0.060) (0.089) (0.126) (0.062) (0.088) (0.127)

.
.
.
.
0.090**
0.008 -0.073 -0.053
(0.032) (0.042) (0.047) (0.032)
0.044
-0.018 -0.067 -0.143**
(0.044) (0.059) (0.067) (0.045)
-0.079
-0.082 0.005 -0.193**
(0.060) (0.082) (0.093) (0.062)
-0.483*** -0.433*** -0.193 -0.442***
(0.085) (0.125) (0.140) (0.089)

Meeting People
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.
-0.072
(0.042)
-0.120*
(0.060)
-0.149
(0.083)
-0.381**
(0.125)

.
-0.078
(0.047)
-0.071
(0.067)
-0.005
(0.094)
-0.177
(0.141)

(ref=Most days)
Once or twice a week
One or twice a month
Less than once a
month/never
Constant
Random Effect
Number of observations
Number of individuals

.
0.142***
(0.028)
0.195***
(0.046)

.
0.128**
(0.039)
0.171**
(0.062)

.
.
0.046 0.042
(0.042) (0.029)
0.069 -0.017
(0.068) (0.047)

.
.
0.038 0.026
(0.039) (0.043)
0.004 0.035
(0.062) (0.068)

0.035
0.209 0.233 -0.082
0.068 0.201
(0.079) (0.111) (0.123) (0.083) (0.111) (0.123)
-0.617*** -0.741***
-0.683*** -1.391***
(0.063) (0.095)
(0.115) (0.169)
1.785***
1.630***
(0.034)
(0.035)
38136
38136 18866 38135
38135 18863
8833
8833
3694
8833
8833
3694

Cluster robust standard errors for pooled logit in parenthesis; * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.

considering these models is to provide a baseline or ‗standard‘ model against which
the alternative estimators, which incorporate repeated measures and control for
unobserved unit heterogeneity, can be compared. Although there is a one year lag in
the measurement of the dependent and independent variables in this model, it is still
essentially cross-sectional, because it makes no use of within-individual variance on
the either side of the equation. The one year difference between the measurement of
the independent and dependent variables may, however, lead to a degree of
attenuation in effect sizes relative to contemporaneous measures.
The results of these cross-sectional models support the contention that social
connections, of both the formal and informal kind, are causal antecedents of trust. We
are more likely to find trusters amongst those with higher levels of associational
membership and those who more regularly attend religious ceremonies. Converting
the logit coefficients to odds ratios shows that the odds of being a truster increase by
50% for each additional membership reported, a substantively as well as statistically
significant effect. Including controls in model 4 reduces the size of the coefficient for
formal memberships by approximately a quarter, although it remains of substantial
magnitude (odds ratio = 1.3) and significant at the 99% level of confidence. Similarly,
the probability of trusting is higher amongst those who talk with their neighbours
more often, although the pattern of this effect only emerges consistently in model 4,
which includes covariates. In model 1, the coefficients for frequency of meeting with
friends and family outside the household are in the opposite direction to theoretical
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expectation, with trust lowest amongst those who report meeting on ‗most days‘,
although this effect disappears once controls are introduced in model 4, with none of
the coefficients remaining significant at the 95% level of confidence.
Turning to the random effects estimates, we can see that they are very similar
to those obtained using the cross-sectional estimator, although the standard errors are
consistently larger, as should be expected.

Although the magnitudes of the

coefficients are not identical, their pattern of direction and significance tell essentially
the same substantive story; social connections have a positive influence on social
trust, with formal associational memberships having the strongest effect – a 26%
increase in the odds of trusting for each additional membership reported. However,
informal connections also seem to exert a powerful influence, with the odds of
trusting being 30% lower for those reporting they never talk to their neighbours
compared to those who report doing this on most days.
A standard reason for reason for preferring the random effect to crosssectional estimators is that it accounts properly for the non-independence of
observations made on the same individual over time, yielding correct standard errors
and significance tests, where cross-sectional estimators do not (Halaby 2003).
However, the parameter estimates of the random effects model are consistent only if
the key assumption noted earlier - that the observed predictors of trust in the model
are uncorrelated with unobserved time-invariant causes - is empirically justified
(Wooldridge 2002). On prima facie grounds, however, it seems unlikely that all
unmeasured, time-invariant causes of trust over this time period have zero correlation
with the independent variables in table 2. And, if the true correlation between these
unobserved causes and the included covariates is non-zero, the random effects
estimator is biased and inconsistent (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). The Chi
Square value of the Hausman test in this instance is 135 which, with 25 degrees of
freedom, is significant at the 99.9% level of confidence. Thus, we must reject the
random effect assumption and prefer the parameter estimates for the fixed effects
models.
The difference between the random and fixed effects estimates in table 2 are
substantial. Using the fixed effects estimator, we now find that none of the social
connection variables are significant predictors of trust. Note that the fixed effects
estimator does not yield estimates for time-invariant variables, which in these models
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are age and gender (coefficients not shown) because these are perfectly collinear with
the random intercept,  i . While the inability to obtain coefficient estimates for timeinvariant variables may be regarded as an important loss of information, it is in fact
the key benefit of the fixed effects framework (Allison 2005; Halaby 2003; Halaby
2004). For, in addition to removing the effects of these observed time-invariant
variables, the model also removes the effect of all unobserved variables which result
in upwardly biased coefficient estimates in Table 2.
When the effects of unobserved time-invariant confounders are removed, we
find both formal and informal social connections to be completely unrelated to trust.
Of particular note in this regard is the coefficient for formal associational
memberships. While the estimates for this variable are of substantial magnitude and
highly significant in both the cross-sectional and random effects models, in the fixed
effects models they are close to zero and a long way from reaching statistical
significance at conventional levels of confidence. Thus, the effect of associational
membership in the cross-sectional estimates derives entirely from between-person
variance. If we consider the effect of an individual changing his or her level of
associational membership over time, it has no effect at all on the subsequent level of
trust. This must lead us to conclude that the strong effect of associational membership
in the cross-sectional and random effect models, and presumably those with a similar
specification in the existing literature, are subject to substantial endogeneity bias.
It is well known, however, that while the fixed effects estimator is consistent
when  i is correlated with the covariate vector, it can also yield considerably less
precise estimates of  than random effects. This is because fixed effects uses only
within-person variability and discards information from units whose score on the
dependent variable remains constant over time. Could the difference in the
coefficients between the random and fixed effects coefficients simply be due to the
difference in statistical power between the two models? Although 52% of respondents
in our analysis sample did not change their trust response over the five waves of
observation, this nevertheless yielded a sample of 18863 observations across 3694
individuals, which should yield sufficient power to detect even small associations
between the social connectedness variables and trust. It seems safe to conclude,
therefore, that the difference in the magnitude and significance of coefficients
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between estimators in table 2 is due to unobserved variable bias in the cross-sectional
and random effects models rather than a lack of statistical power in the fixed effects
models.

DISCUSSION
A key tenet of social capital theory is that norms of reciprocity and trust emerge from
the formal and informal institutions of civil society (Putnam et al 1993). Citizens
become more trusting of one another as they experience the benefits of cooperative
behaviour that is fostered within clubs, societies, and associations but also within less
formal social networks that exist between friends, relations and neighbours. Enhanced
trust, in turn, leads people to become more likely to engage in civic institutions in the
future, creating a virtuous circle between social connectedness and trust (Claibourn
and Martin, 1997). This process can also unfold in reverse, a phenomenon that
prominent academics, politicians, and social commentators have identified as being
partly responsible for the increasing atomisation and socio-political disengagement of
western citizenries in the latter decades of the twentieth century. These are grand and
consequential claims. Yet, the vast majority of the evidence base presented in support
of the idea that formal and informal civic engagement fosters trust is based on either
descriptive analysis of long-term trends in survey and administrative time-series, or
on regression models applied to cross-sectional data (Delhey and Newton 2003;
Putnam 2000). It is well-known that such approaches are susceptible to potentially
severe biases arising out of the failure to adequately account for unobserved
confounding variables (Halaby 2004; Morgan and Winship 2007).
Using conventional cross-sectional regression, our own analysis here lends
support to the virtuous circle model; we find trusters to have more ‗connected‘
associational memberships, to more frequently attend religious services, and to talk
with their neighbours on a more regular basis. These are not weak effects that rely on
small p values for claims to be taken seriously. Even when a broad range of controls
are added to the model, we find that the odds of trusting increase by 25% for each
additional membership an individual reports. However, when we exploit the true
value of the repeated measures data available to us – the ability to model withinperson change over time - we find that the cross-sectional estimates are subject to
substantial upward bias. Because the fixed effects estimator controls for all observed
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and unobserved fixed characteristics of individual units, the difference in coefficient
magnitude between the random and fixed effects coefficients can be interpreted as
resulting from the influence of omitted confounding variables (Halaby 2004). Our
findings are robust to a number of sensitivity checks relating to the coding and
treatment of key variables in our analysis, which have not been reported here due to
limitations of space. For instance, our results remain substantively unchanged if we
combine the measures of social connectedness in various different ways, including
specification as latent variables, in order to mitigate random measurement error in the
predictor variables. Similarly, when we operationalize our measure of associational
membership as being an ‗active‘ member (rather than just a member), our conclusions
are not materially altered.
This type of endogeneity bias can also arise when an outcome variable exerts a
causal influence on predictor variables. The models we have used here provide only
limited protection against this possibility, through the use of lagged independent
variables. And, if the ‗virtuous circle‘ model is to be believed, we should expect the
right hand side variables in our equations to themselves be affected by changes in
trust at the individual level. However, while the problem of reciprocal causality is
certainly an inherent limitation of the approach we have adopted, it is most germane
when a fixed effects specification shows a significant, rather than a non-significant
effect. This is because the magnitude of any statistically non-zero coefficient will
derive, at least in part, from the opposite of the process codified in the statistical
model. While it is logically possible that non-significant coefficients can also be
biased through reverse causality, via some complex suppression effect, this would
appear, on a priori grounds at least, to be rather unlikely in most substantive contexts.
In our view, then, our results provide no support for a causal effect in either direction
between trusting and joining.
Turning to the substantive implications of our findings, our results lend
support to the view that the correlation between associational membership and trust
arises from trusters selecting into membership via pre-existing dispositional
characteristics (Rothstein and Uslaner 2006; Stolle 1998; Uslaner 2002). This begs the
question of what this characteristic, or characteristics, might be. The general
unresponsiveness of trust to changes in an individual‘s formal and informal social
connections over a quite substantial period of time certainly accords with the view
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that social trust is not so much a rational reaction to ‗the slings and arrows of
outrageous fortune‘ as it is a general outlook which develops early in the life-course
and which remains relatively immune to subsequent life-events (Skocpol 2003; Stolle
and Hooghe 2004b; Uslaner 2002). This is, of course, a speculation rather than an
inference from our empirical analysis. It does, though, suggest a useful focus for
future investigations into the origins of social trust.
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